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Effects of decoupling on land use:  
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Landnutzungseffekts von Entkopplung:  
Eine EU-weite, regional differenzierte Analyse 




This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the impacts of the 
„Luxembourg Compromise” as compared to a continuation of 
Agenda 2000 to the year 2010. The employed new version of the 
CAPRI model allows us to represent the different member states’ 
implementations of the CAP reform and to reflect endogenous world 
market prices based upon a spatial global trade model. The specific 
contribution of the analysis is a detailed look at the impacts of 
national differences in the CAP implementation and regional pro-
duction structures with respect to changes in land allocation. At EU 
level, cereal areas decrease by about 5% and oilseeds by about 3%. 
This is paralleled by increases in the set-aside acreage and exten-
sive fodder production. However, significant differences at the 
regional level can be observed. They are caused mainly by diffe-
rences in the shares of durum wheat and fodder maize. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert EU-weite Auswirkungen der so 
genannten „Luxemburger Beschlüsse“ im Jahr 2010 im Vergleich 
zur Agenda 2000. Die der Analyse zugrunde liegenden Simulations-
ergebnisse basieren auf einer überarbeiteten Version des CAPRI-
Modellsystems, das die national unterschiedliche Implementierung 
des Reformpaketes abbildet und gleichzeitig endogene Preise mit-
tels eines globalen räumlichen Handelsmodells erfasst. Der Schwer-
punkt bei der Ergebnisdarstellung bildet die Analyse von Land-
nutzungsänderungen vor dem Hintergrund regionaler Produktions-
strukturen und der spezifischen nationalen Ausgestaltung der 
Reform. Während EU-weit die Getreideflächen um ca. 5% sinken und 
der Ölsaatenanbau um ca. 3% zurückgeht bei gleichzeitiger Aus-
dehnung von Flächenstilllegung und extensivem Futterbau, zeigen 
sich deutliche regionale Unterschiede, insbesondere in Abhängig-
keit von Flächenanteilen des Hartweizens und des Futtermais. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Entkopplung; Agrarsektormodell; Luxemburger Beschlüsse; Land-
allokation 
1. Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform proposed 
by the Commission in 2002 as successor of the Agenda 
2000 introduced a major change in the income support 
regime with potentially significant effects on land use: the 
decoupling of direct payments from production. Further 
important reform measures have been the introduction of 
obligatory modulation of payments to generate funds for 
rural development and agri-environmental programs (second 
pillar), the reduction of price support for dairy products (in 
part compensated through direct payments), and the intro-
duction of obligatory cross-compliance. The idea behind 
this reform has been to increase the market orientation of 
European agriculture by cutting the link between payments 
and production (decoupling mechanism). This is expected 
to allow farmers to adopt those production activities that are 
most profitable under the current or expected market condi-
tions. 
However, the increasing concern about the effects of this 
policy reform on marginal agricultural areas led to a modi-
fication of the initial proposal and considerably increased 
the complexity of the system. The main change included in 
the final regulation was the adoption of ‘restricted or partial 
decoupling’ instead of full decoupling of premiums from 
production (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
2003a). With this decision, member states kept the option 
of paying premiums for a specific group of activities cou-
pled to production either fully or up to a certain percentage. 
Several studies have aimed at including these instruments 
and estimating the effects of this policy ‘cocktail’ on agri-
cultural land use. BALKHAUSEN et al. (2005) compare re-
sults from different models
1 and conclude that cereal and 
silage maize areas as well as ruminant production in the 
EU-15 will probably decline as an effect of decoupling. The 
extent of the projected reduction, however, depends on the 
specific characteristics of the model used (suitability of 
modelling approach to represent decoupling, activity cover-
age, scenario baseline, etc.) and specific assumptions on 
national decoupling options. FAPRI estimates a reduction 
in cereal cropping of 1.1% in year 2012, whereas CAPSIM 
and ESIM estimate for year 2009 a decrease in land use of 
cereals of 5.0% and 4.0%, respectively. Previous studies 
with the CAPRI model show somewhat more pronounced 
effects with estimates for the EU-15 of -7.5% for cereal 
hectares based on the first mid-term review proposal (BRITZ 
et al., 2003) and -5.7% by taking into account only the 2003 
legislation and estimating a ‘most probable’ set of national 
coupling implementation options. Furthermore, ESPOSTI et 
al. (2004) used the AG-MEMOD model and come up with 
a reduction in cereals of 2%.
2 On fodder activities only 
                                                           
1    ESIM (ERS/USDA, Stanford and Göttingen University), 
CAPSIM (University of Bonn), CAPRI (University of   
Bonn; 2003 version), FAPRI (Iowa State University),   
AGLINK (OECD), GTAP (Purdue University) and FARMIS  
(BALKHAUSEN et al., 2005: 8). 
2    To date only results for a EU-9 have been published with   
the AG-MEMOD model. This ‘composite model’ covers:   
Italy, Spain, Greece, Finland, France, Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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CAPSIM and CAPRI include information at European level 
with estimates for acreage changes ranging around -5% and 
+15% for fodder maize and ‘other fodder’ respectively. 
FARMIS estimates a -7% variation in fodder maize area 
and +20% for other fodder in Germany. 
In this paper, a revised version of the CAPRI model
3 is 
applied to evaluate regional and aggregate impacts of the 
Luxembourg agreement and subsequent smaller reform 
decisions (tobacco, olive oil, starch potatoes) on land use 
decisions in the EU compared with the Agenda 2000 pol-
icy. This revision includes the current implementation 
strategies regarding decoupling and type of premium re-
gimes in the different member states, a re-specification of 
the market component reflecting most recent tariff data and 
a larger set of preferential trade agreements, and the expan-
sion of the model to the 10 new member states. The analy-
sis of the model results at various scales aims at explaining 
aggregated impacts based on differences in national policy 
implementation and the variations in regional production 
systems. In section 2, a brief overview of the model with 
special attention to land use allocation is given. In sec-
tion  3, the baseline and impact scenarios are described. 
Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of modelling results at 
various scales, and in section 5, conclusions are drawn. 
2. Model details 
2.1 Overview 
For the purposes of this study, the CAPRI (Common Agri-
cultural Policy Regionalised Impact) modelling system is 
chosen as the instrument for quantitative analysis (BRITZ, 
2004)
4. CAPRI is an agricultural sector model linking 
non-linear mathematical programming models for ca. 250 
regions
5 covering the EU-25, Norway, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia with a global market model for agricultural products. In 
each regional model, agricultural supply of up to 39 crops 
and 19  animal activities covers all agricultural activities 
according to the definition of national accounts, as well as 
feed and further input demand. They are modelled by 
maximising market revenues plus premiums minus a 
non-linear cost function under a limited number of con-
straints: land availability, policy (quotas and set-aside obli-
gations) and feeding restrictions. The supply component of 
the model allows for an explicit representation of the diffe-
rent (partially coupled) payment schemes of the CAP, dif-
ferentiating between production activities and regions. The 
                                                           
3   In the current analysis the CAPRI_05v1 version (first version 
released in 2005) is used in order to differentiate from previ-
ous ones. In BALKHAUSEN et al. (2005) results of a previous 
version of CAPRI released in 2003 are discussed (BRITZ et al., 
2003). 
4    The CAPRI modelling system is maintained, applied and 
further developed by a network of European researchers   
co-ordinated by the Institute of Agricultural Policy, University 
Bonn, and mainly funded by EU research projects or direct- 
ly by EU Commission services. A reference version of the 
model along with its documentation, underlying data base   
and exploitation tools is distributed to the network during 
yearly training sessions. Further information can be found at: 
http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm 
5   These regions correspond to the Nuts 2 EUROSTAT nomen-
clature. 
quadratic cost function is equivalent to the one typically 
employed in applications of ’Positive Mathematical Pro-
gramming‘ (PMP; HOWITT, 1995). Contrary to linear pro-
gramming models, the non-linear formulation ensures a 
diversified crop mix and smooth supply response observ-
able at the aggregated level. It implicitly captures changes 
of marginal costs associated with changing activity levels 
due to capacity constraints or rotational effects. They also 
can be considered as a reduced form of representation of 
risk and aggregation errors (HECKELEI, 2002). 
The regional supply models take netput prices as given. In 
order to achieve price endogeneity of the overall system, 
the supply models are linked to a market model. This mar-
ket component is a global spatial multi-commodity model 
based on the ‘Armington assumption’ (ARMINGTON, 1969). 
It covers 40 products representing all marketable outputs 
delivered by the activities included in the regional supply 
models as well as oils and cakes from oilseeds, sugar and 
seven types of dairy products (skimmed and whole milk 
powder, butter, cheese, fresh milk products, cream and 
concentrated milk). Distinguishing imports by origin and 
exports by destination, the Armington assumption allows 
the modelling of bilateral trade flows between 18 countries 
or country blocks in the world.
6 These trade flows are af-
fected by a complete set of import tariffs expressed in ad 
valorem and specific terms, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and 
trade preferences given by the EU, flexible levies for cere-
als
7 as well as sugar and rice safeguards
8. Export subsidies 
in the EU are modelled endogenously as a function of 
world and EU market prices, and changes in intervention 
stocks as a function of EU market and administrative 
prices. Flexible functions complying with microeconomic 
conditions ensure that the model’s reactions are in line with 
economic theory and allow for a consistent welfare analy-
sis.  
The supply and market modules of CAPRI are linked by an 
iterative procedure which delivers in each iteration prices 
from the market model to the regional supply models. They 
are solved at these fixed prices and the resulting supply and 
feed quantities are then returned to the market model, so 
that a new set of prices is generated. This procedure is re-
peated until convergence of prices and quantities is 
achieved. Additionally, in between iterations, CAP pay-
ments are adjusted in an additional ‘premium module’ to 
comply with value or physical ceilings as notified by the 
                                                           
6    Trade blocks in the model are: EU-15, EU-10, Bulgaria  &     
Romania, rest of Europe, USA, Canada, Mexico, MERCOSUR 
countries, rest of South America, India, China, Japan, rest of 
Asia,  Australia & New Zealand, Mediterranean countries, 
least developed countries, ACP countries and rest of the 
world. The EU-15, EU-10, MERCOSUR and Mediterranean 
countries feature behavioural equations at single country level. 
7   The flexible levy or tariff is equal to 155% of the intervention 
price minus the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) import price 
as long as the resulting tariff is below the WTO bound rate.  
8    Data on import tariffs are obtained from the Agricultural 
Market Access Database (http://www.amad.org) and aggre-
gated to the product and regional coverage of the model. The 
final tariff is the result of a simple formula: sum of an un-
weighted arithmetic average (50%) and an import weighted 
average (50%) of all tariff lines related to one product cate-
gory in the model. Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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Commission. Linked to the results of the premium and 
market modules, there is a module which calculates the 
complete first pillar of the FEOGA budget ex-ante. Finally, 
iterations also ensure that young animal markets at EU level 
are cleared by a price mechanism which links raising and 
fattening animal activities. 
2.2 Land allocation 
In CAPRI, the total agricultural area in each of the Nuts 2 
regions is divided into arable and grassland, which are 
considered fixed resources and, consequently, are not 
changed in simulation runs. Crop activities, including set-
aside and fallow land, compete with each other for this 
limited resource, which is distributed according to the acti-
vity contribution to the objective function under the explic-
itly modelled agronomic and economic constraints. The list 
of crop activities exhausts the whole Utilisable Agricultural 
Area (UAA) and covers vegetables, fruits, olive oil, etc. 
Nurseries, flowers and a residual activity from the Eco-
nomic Accounts of Agriculture are trend forecasted and 
kept constant in the simulation.  Under the Agenda 2000 
policy package, obligatory set-aside is linked through addi-
tional constraints to Grandes Cultures. Moreover, all crop 
activities are modelled including a high and low yield vari-
ant with their own set of input and output coefficients and 
resulting gross margins. Yields at regional level are hence 
endogenous and react to changes in market and policy in-
centives. Even with grassland areas fixed, the model still 
might change the amount of grass produced through chang-
ing intensity of production. 
For all activities, marginal revenues, consisting of market 
revenues plus premiums per hectare, are equilibrated with 
marginal costs at the optimal solution, including opportu-
nity costs of exhausted resources. In the case of land, 
shadow prices are set to rental prices in the base period, 
when available, or are derived from the average profitabil-
ity of the crop rotation. Here, the model specification dif-
fers from the typical PMP approach, where shadow values 
of limiting resources are set arbitrarily in a first step based 
on an auxiliary restricted linear program (HECKELEI and 
BRITZ, 2005). The linear and non-linear cost parameters are 
calibrated such that observed activity levels satisfy condi-
tions for optimal land allocation given the shadow prices of 
land and prior information on supply elasticities. 
2.3 Implementation of premium schemes 
The model distinguishes about 25 different payment schemes 
of the CAP, including the options introduced with the Lux-
embourg Compromise 2003. These schemes differ regard-
ing the payment base (per hectare, per head, per slaughtered 
head or per production unit), the list of eligible activities 
and the type of premium ceilings (expressed either in 
physical and/or value limits). The payments may vary 
across member states or even Nuts 2 regions depending on 
historic yields or, as in case of the Luxembourg Compro-
mise, on premium envelopes based on historic volumes. All 
premiums are then linked to production activities and can 
be interpreted as activity specific factor subsidies paid ei-
ther per hectare of land for crop activities or per ani-
mal/slaughtered head for animal production activities. So 
technically, premiums are generally ‘not decoupled’. How-
ever, the impact on land allocation depends on the differen-
tiation of premiums between production activities. In the 
case of a regional flat rate premium, no differential impact 
on profitability of activities per hectare would be exerted. 
The different premiums paid to the activities are propor-
tionally cut if ceilings of the relating scheme are exceeded. 
For example, under a certain scheme herds with 1,000 ani-
mals benefit from the full declared premium. If the actual 
herd size is 2,000, each animal receives only 50% of the 
declared premium. A herd with less than 1,000 animals 
implies that the budget of the scheme is not exhausted. 
Despite its richness in detail, a certain aggregation bias of 
this approach has to be discussed. First of all, the effect of 
premium ceilings can only be evaluated at the lowest re-
gional breakdown of the model, currently Nuts 2 regions
9. 
Secondly, further farm specific conditions for premium 
modulation are not implemented. In the case of stocking 
density restrictions, we would expect ‘shadow premiums’ 
attached to fodder area if we solve ex-post a (binary) linear 
programming problem for a single farm. These shadow 
premiums would capture the fact that animal premiums are 
paid (or increased) if a certain fodder area is existent. That 
effect is mimicked in CAPRI by reallocating in a rather ad-
hoc manner certain percentages of the animal premiums to 
fodder producing activities
10. And thirdly, due to the pro-
portionate cut of premiums in case of exceeded ceilings, the 
model is not able to capture a farm specific ceiling which 
lets the marginal premium drop to zero. This drawback 
should be kept in mind when looking at the results of the 
Luxembourg Compromise for such countries where the 
so-called farm premium was implemented, leading to the 
number of eligible hectares being generally larger than the 
base area. In this case, we would expect the rent to go 
rather to the premium entitlement and not to the land. In 
CAPRI, however, the premium paid per hectare would be 
proportionally reduced to satisfy the value ceiling and 
would thus affect the land rent. 
3. The scenarios 
3.1 Baseline scenario 
The CAPRI baseline captures the current CAP legislation: 
the 2003 Luxembourg Compromise plus 2004 amendments 
dealing with fibre crops, tobacco and olive oil (COUNCIL OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003a and COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2004). The baseline reflects the 
projections by DG-AGRI, FAPRI and FAO on hectares, 
yields and production for major crops and animal products 
at European and international level (COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2004; FAPRI, 2003; BRUINSMA, 
2003). Results are presented for the year 2010 in current 
prices, inflation being set at 1.9% per annum. In opposite to 
previous reforms, the new CAP introduces a certain degree 
of flexibility regarding the implementation of the new pay-
ment schemes. The following table shows the implementa-
tion options selected by the different member states in-
                                                           
9   A model version with farm types inside the Nuts 2 regions is 
currently in revision and planned to be operational in the near 
future. 
10   50% of bull premiums, sheep and goat premiums, national 
envelope for sheep and goats, suckler cow premiums and na-
tional envelope for bovine meat cattle are mapped to grass and 
fodder land. Additionally 70% of bull and suckler cow exten-
sification premiums are also mapped to grass and fodder land. Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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cluded in the CAPRI baseline. The information contained in 
it draws to a large extent on a recent review by MASSOT 
MARTÍ (2005) (see table 1). 
The effect of the different payment schemes offered as part 
of the Luxembourg Compromise in CAPRI can be de-
scribed as follows: 
• In the case of the so-called regional or hybrid models 
(identical premiums at regional level), all crops are eligi-
ble, including to a certain percentage of fallow land. Sim-
ple hybrid models (Denmark and Sweden) define certain 
percentages of payments as farm specific and maintain 
them constant in the future. Dynamic hybrid models 
(Germany, Finland, United Kingdom and EU-8) lead to a 
regional flat rate per hectare within a defined time period. 
The decoupled part of the crop and animal specific pre-
mium is converted into a flat rate premium for any type of 
agricultural land kept in good agricultural condition. Dif-
ferent premiums may also be paid on arable and grassland 
(in all cases but Sweden). For example, in Germany uni-
form premium rates are defined at Nuts 1 level (regionali-
sation level of individual “Länder”) at the end of the tran-
sition period in 2013. 
• In the case of individual farm premium models all so-
called “COP” activities (cereals, oilseeds, fodder includ-
ing grassland, fibre crops, sugar beet and all types of 
set-aside) are eligible but the base areas exclude sugar 
beet (as stated in the legislation). Contrary to the regional 
flat rate, fruits and vegetables as well as other permanent 
crops are excluded both from the base area and the list of 
eligible crops. As already mentioned, a certain aggrega-
tion bias must be admitted in this analysis, since each 
Nuts 2 region is treated in the model as one farm. Accord-
ingly, in case of the farm premium model, premiums per 
hectare for the eligible crops are identical at Nuts 2 level. 
The premium envelope in € per year and region for the 
different premium schemes is evaluated based on the pay-
ments per activity valid in Agenda 2000 plus the modifica-
tions introduced by the Luxembourg Compromise and sub-
sequent reforms (tobacco, olives, starch potatoes).Thy are 
multiplied by the base year levels (three-year average 
2000-2002). At this stage, eventual cuts in declared premi-
ums per head or hectare might occur if ceilings on quanti-
ties or values are exceeded. Finally, premiums are reduced 
according to the modulation percentages set by the Com-
mission. These amount to 5% from 2008 onward subject to 
farm structure dependent reductions in the modulation per-
centage as the first 5,000 € of premiums per farm are ex-
empt from modulation. 
In terms of decoupling, it should be understood that the 
current legislation has been, more or less, literally trans-
lated into the model specification. In the case of ‘full de-
coupling’ (Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy and 
Malta), the affected premiums are removed from the activi-
ties where they had been paid to and added to a new budget 
which is evenly distributed to all crops defined as eligible 
under the new scheme. Hence, the new premiums are inter-
preted as ‘crop specific subsidies to land’, with many or 
even all crops receiving the same premium per hectare. The 













































































































































































































































































France x x x x 2006 2006
Belgium + 
Luxemburg 




Netherlands x x x 2006 2007
Austria x x 2005 2007
Germany x x 2005 2005
Finland x x x 2006 2006
Denmark x x x 2005 2005
United Kingdom 
2
x   (Wales, 
Scotland)
x (North 
Ireland) x 2005 2005
Ireland x 2005 2005
Sweden x x 2005 2007
Spain x x (5%) x x x x 2006 2006
Portugal x x 2005 2007
Greece x x x x 2006 2007
Italy x x 2005 2006
Rest (EU-10) 
4 x 2007-09 ---
Member state
Lifestock Reference for the Single 
























































1  Belgium and Luxemburg are modelled together in CAPRI. 
2  Within the United Kingdom England has chosen a dynamic hybrid model, Wales and Scotland a farm historical premium scheme 
and North Ireland a static hybrid model. 
3  It is allowed to keep 60% of tobacco payments coupled until 2010. Afterwards 100% decoupling must be assumed. 
4  For the EU10 countries no partial decoupling is considered. A flat rate premium is assumed to increase gradually over time until 
2013 (in 2012, 90 % of the negotiated premium ceiling values are paid to agricultural activities). 
Source:   Arts. 66 and 68 of (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN, 2003b); Art. 110 Reg. EC/864/2004; partially based on the compilation 
made by (MASSOT MARTÍ, 2005). Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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premiums are ‘paid out’ in the model at 100%, but since 
(almost) all types of agricultural land uses are covered, the 
major part is mapped into a change of the land rent. Indeed, 
if the gross margins of all crops in a region were increased 
by the same amount per hectare, the only effect would be 
an increase of the land rent by the very same amount, ce-
teris paribus. However, effects on the simulation at hand are 
somewhat more complex, since (a)  previously coupled 
premiums are removed both from crop and animal activi-
ties, but replaced by flat rates paid solely to crops, (b) not 
all crops are eligible depending on the implementation 
scheme, (c) there are additional exogenous changes in other 
parameters such as administrative prices and set-aside obli-
gations, and (d) there is a simultaneity of price and land 
allocation changes. 
In almost all European regions, there is fallow land, which 
was not in set-aside programs in the past. The question is if 
this land should be made eligible for premiums under the 
Luxemburg compromise. The consideration of two corner 
solutions sheds some light on this issue. The first one is to 
exclude any fallow land currently not in set-aside programs 
from being eligible, following the argument that it is not 
possible to keep it in ‘good agricultural conditions’ if it was 
not found in set-aside programs so far. This argument may 
be backed up with the assumption that cross-compliance 
may be more strictly enforced in the future. The second 
solution would consider all fallow land found in statistics as 
eligible for decoupled premiums. There are two possible 
arguments which favour this solution: (1)  in the Agenda 
2000, upper limits on set-aside at farm level were initially 
established in some member states. These restrictions are 
removed under the new legislation and could trigger an 
increase in voluntary set-aside; (2) it could be argued that 
farmers may have been cautious about putting large land 
shares in set-aside programs in an ‘environment’ of coupled 
support schemes, fearing future drawbacks on production 
entitlements or premium rights. These considerations could 
be removed if the new legislation is felt as a ‘no return’ 
switch to decoupled support. Reality will probably lie 
somewhere in between the two corner solutions. A mix of 
both is used for the simulations presented here which ren-
ders between 25% and 75% of the fallow land found in the 
base year outside of set-aside programs as eligible, depend-
ing on the share of voluntary set-aside compared to that of 
fallow land.
11 
3.2 Comparison scenario 
The results for the Luxembourg Compromise are contrasted 
with simulation results for 2010 under a continuation of 
Agenda 2000, which not only would have led to different 
future premium schemes but to some further changes in 
Common Market Organisations (CMOs). Notably, we de-
fine Agenda 2000 as the legislation in place before the 
Luxembourg CAP reform for the year 2010. In this sce-
nario, administrative prices would remain at higher levels in 
                                                           
11   In order to estimate the costs linked to cross-compliance con-
ditions (an additional problem), an ex-post cost estimation for 
the existing set-aside based on econometric work with FADN 
data and standard gross margins is used (and then kept con-
stant during simulations). In the case of fallow land currently 
not included in set-aside programs, a 50% extra cost compared 
to the existing set-aside is assumed to render it eligible. 
2010 for cereals (+2.5%)
12, rice (298 € instead of the 150 € 
agreed in the Luxemburg compromise) and butter (+10%). 
Moreover, contrary to the Luxembourg Compromise, no 
limits on the intervention of butter, rice and rye are intro-
duced, along with subsidies paid to process or market dairy 
products at base period levels. The latter are assumed to 
drop by 50% in the comparison scenario with respect to the 
base period budgetary outlays, assuming that these cuts 
were used to finance increased payments to dairy cows. 
4. Results 
Generally, a reduction of activity levels profiting from 
coupled support under the Agenda 2000 along with price 
increases for related outputs and/or substitution with im-
ports is expected from the application of the Luxemburg 
agreement. This effect should be especially large in mar-
ginal areas, where the probability that part of the coupled 
premiums is required to cover production costs is higher. 
Likewise, the removal of coupled support should increase 
land rents if land is the scarce factor to activate the pre-
mium entitlements. The current analysis supports these 
general expectations, but allows simulating the quantitative 
dimension of these reactions at EU, national and regional 
level. 
4.1 Pan-European perspective on land use changes 
As presented in table 2, the main effects of the Luxembourg 
Compromise on land use at EU-25 level compared to 
Agenda 2000 are a reduction of the area of cereals (-5.5% 
or -3 Mio. ha) and oilseeds (-2.7% or -164 thousand ha) as 
well as of vegetables and permanent crops (-1.6% or 
-224 thousand ha), the latter an effect of decoupling premi-
ums paid to olive trees (-203 thousand hectares, 50% being 
removed in Spain). These changes are offset by a larger 
number of hectares of set-aside and fallow land (+13,2%) 
and fodder production (+2.4%). These land use changes 
interact with a drop in beef fattening activities (-3.5%). 
The effect in the new member states is generally stronger 
than in the EU-15, as premiums there constitute a larger 
part of the farm’s gross margin. It may be somewhat aston-
ishing to see differences in obligatory set-aside of -1.3% for 
the EU-25, since the new legislation stipulates a continua-
tion of the historic set-aside obligation. This effect can be 
explained, however, through the changes in cropping pat-
tern between the base 2000-2002 (for which the historic set-
aside obligation was calculated) and the year 2010 under 
the Agenda 2000 regime plus a decreasing share of small 
producers
13. This leads to a higher proportion of crop pro-
duction activities with set-aside obligations attached, so that 
the average set-aside rate increases under the Agenda 2000 
from the base year to 2010. For the Luxembourg Compro-
mise, however, the set-aside obligations are fixed at the 
three year average 2000-2002. 
                                                           
12   This corresponds to the abolishment of the monthly reports in 
the Luxemburg Compromise. 
13   Small producers are considered those whose COP production 
is less than 80 tonnes. These are exempt of the set-aside obli-
gation. The small producer shares for 2010 are trended fore-
casted based on information from the European Commission 
for the EU-15 member states. Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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4.2 Land use changes in Germany at large  
The effects on land use in Germany are similar in direction 
to those observed for the EU-25 but are smaller in magni-
tude, at least for the major crop activities (see table 3). The 
main driving force underlying the smaller changes in crop 
rotations in Germany compared to the EU-25 is the share of 
crops on total arable land where coupled premiums had 
been paid, i.e. the larger the share, the lower the effect
14. In 
Germany the share of crops which were not profiting from 
premium schemes in Agenda 2000 (e.g. vegetables, horti-
culture) is quite low, so that the effect of the premium re-
distribution is dampened with respect to the European aver-
age. However, Germany features larger shares of arable 
land used for fodder production which where not eligible 
for premiums under the Agenda 2000, and here, the effect 
is stronger compared to the EU-25 average. Furthermore, in 
southern European countries, significant reductions in du-
rum wheat production occurs, as this has been one of the 
more highly subsidized production activities before the 
most recent CAP reform. Due to the regional premium 
model, the redistribution of the animal premiums in Ger-
many solely impacts on land rent, not on the allocation 
change for crops, as all crops under a specific land con-
straint benefit from the same amount per hectare stemming 
from regional animal envelopes. That is not the case in 
countries using the farm premiums, as there, the animal 
                                                           
14   This is easily understood when looking at the extreme situa-
tion where a farm would only crop cereals and oilseeds under 
Agenda 2000 and the individual farm premium scheme would 
now be introduced. Apart from modulation, there would be no 
effect on premiums or cropping shares since the Agenda 2000 
regime would have already acted as a uniform premium per 
hectare. 
premiums are redistributed between a smaller number of 
eligible crops, which may explain to a certain degree 
stronger reactions in EU-25 compared to Germany. Some 
effect is caused by the partial coupling premiums in the 
different member states. Taking crop and animal premiums 
into account, larger changes could be expected under ‘full 
decoupling’ and ‘uniform regional premiums’ compared to 
the farm premium model. However, this effect is not easy 
to differentiate when comparing Germany and the EU-25: 
whereas the EU-10 uses a specific implementation of the 
regional flat rate premium, the so-called ‘Single Area Pay-
ment Scheme’, most other member states apply the farm 
premium system, some keeping parts of the old premiums 
coupled. Compared to the European average, the degree of 
decoupling in Germany is higher, so that stronger reactions 
in Germany could be expected, but the effect on the crop 
allocation appears to be limited given the above crop share 
argument. Finally, it should be mentioned that the larger 
changes in the EU-25 aggregate come from the EU-10, 
where the quality of certain results is still doubtful, as ex-
plained in more detail below. 
In animal production, decoupling of premiums leads to 
rather pronounced changes in gross margins of some cattle 
activities, depending on the member state specific imple-
mentation. As shown in tables 2 and 3, reactions in Ger-
many (-10.4% in beef meat activities) are more pronounced 
compared to other member states (-3.5% on average for the 
EU-25), mainly due to the fact that some countries keep 
certain percentages of premiums in the cattle chain as cou-
pled support (see table 1). Additionally, Germany has a 
rather large share of less profitable cattle activities in mid-
range mountain areas.  
Further reactions in the model are more easily understood if 
the interactions with markets for outputs, young animals 
Table 2.  Land use, yield and production effects for groups of activities in the EU-25  
(Agenda 2000 and Luxemburg Compromise; year 2010) 
Income
 1 Hectares or 
herd size
Yield Supply Income
 1 Hectares or 
herd size
Yield Supply
Euro/ha or head 1000 ha or hds
kg or 1/1000 
head/ha or head
1000 t Euro/ha or head 1000 ha or hds
kg or 1/1000 
head/ha or head
1000 t
408.2 54349.4 5390.1 292948.4 418.3 51345.6 5471.3 280928.9
2.5% -5.5% 1.5% -4.1%
304.0 6189.2 2533.3 15678.9 347.0 6024.8 2527.1 15225.3
14.1% -2.7% -0.2% -2.9%
1410.2 9355.4 30029.1 280935.5 1466.2 9388.2 30681.1 288041.5
4.0% 0.4% 2.2% 2.5%
3627.8 13990.0 20512.6 286970.6 3584.2 13766.4 20801.9 286367.1
-1.2% -1.6% 1.4% -0.2%
112.0 71188.3 18153.1 1292290.9 250.0 72920.4 17638.2 1286187.3
123.2% 2.4% -2.8% -0.5%
130.4 13696.4 169.8 2326.0 199.6 15510.2 147.2 2282.9
53.1% 13.2% -13.3% -1.9%
337.3 93763.9 1999.8 187508.9 92133.9 2022.4 186326.9
-1.7% 1.1% -0.6%
















1  Income is defined as revenues plus premiums minus costs. It is important to note that in the case of animal activities decoupled 
premiums do not remain at the activity level but are distributed to land (fodder and grassland), so that income is not anymore a good 
indicator.
 
Source: own calculations; CAPRI Modelling System Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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and the effect on fodder areas are kept in mind. For meat 
markets the EU trade regime effectively allows imports 
only under preferential agreements, in many cases up-
per-bounded by binding Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs). This 
prevents to a larger extent import substitution when   
EU meat production drops, which in combination with a 
rather inelastic demand leads to a strong price effect   
(see table 4). Secondly, the majority of calves in the EU 
still originate from dairy cow production, where the drop  
in administrative prices for butter and skimmed milk pow-
der reduces quota rents but does not eliminate them.   
The effect is that the dairy cow herd in the EU remains 
almost unchanged
15. In addition, there are only modest 
reactions in the number of suckler cows as member states 
with large suckler cow herds (e.g. France) have decided to 
keep suckler cow premiums coupled. The reduced demand 
for calves from beef fattening activities resulting from pre-
mium removal thus meets a rather inelastic supply of calves 
and leads to a reduction in prices for calves. This in turn 
dampens the income loss in fattening activities. Thirdly,   
the uniform premiums render fodder production more at-
tractive, as the competitiveness of cereals and oilseeds is 
reduced.  
The model simulates feeding practices with reduced cereals 
and increased fodder shares compared to Agenda 2000. It 
should be mentioned in this context that fodder prices used 
to calculate the gross margins of the activities as shown in 
table 3 under ‘income per hectare or head’ are calculated 
based on the Economic Accounts for Agriculture for the 
average year 2000-2002 and inflated to 2010. Since they 
                                                           
15   There are two „types“ of dairy cows in the model differentiated 
by milk yields, so that changes in the herd size may take place 
at regional level even if total milk production is constant. 
are not changed between scenarios, the income drop ob-
served in cattle activities (-17.1%) is most probably exag-
gerated. It must be kept in mind that, compared to market-
able feed, fodder costs reflect production costs and substitu-
tion values in the regional supply models. 
4.3 The regional dimension of changes in  
premiums 
The changes in premiums at regional level stem from four 
different effects: (1) cuts of premiums due to modulation, 
(2)  increased premiums for dairy cows, abolishment of 
durum wheat support in so-called ‘established’ regions, and 
some minor changes in support to energy crops, pulses and 
durum wheat in “traditional” regions, (3) a re-distribution 
of premiums in case of regional flat rate schemes between 
Nuts 2 regions inside a Nuts 1 region and (4) reductions in 
the fill rate of premium envelopes under reduced coupled 
support. 
On average, premiums increase by about 2% in EU-25. 
Figure 1 shows “no change” as medium grey, so that ac-
cordingly more regions have increased premiums (dark 
grey) compared to decreased premiums (light grey). It 
should be mentioned that in some cases the average amount 
paid per hectare in Agenda 2000 is quite small, so that 
small changes may trigger a large percentage cut (e.g. ‘Cas-
tilla y Leon’ in Spain, where average premiums drop from 
111 to 106 €/ha). 
The so-called “modulation” could cut premiums up to 5%, 
but the actual effect depends on the farm structure, as the 
first 5,000 € of premiums received per farm are exempted 
from modulation. Unfortunately, information on the distri-
bution of farm premiums was available only at member 
state level, so that no regional differentiation of modulation 
is reflected here. U.K. and Germany show the highest cut 
Table 3.  Land use, yield and production effects for groups of activities in Germany (Agenda 2000 and  








Euro/ha or head 1000 ha or hds
kg or 1/1000 
head/ha or head
1000 t Euro/ha or head 1000 ha or hds
kg or 1/1000 
head/ha or head
1000 t
412.0 7301.1 7024.1 51283.6 469.5 7100.7 7048.2 50047.0
14.0% -2.7% 0.3% -2.4%
508.8 867.3 3897.7 3380.7 582.5 851.0 3903.5 3321.7
14.5% -1.9% 0.2% -1.7%
2031.4 992.2 40211.9 39897.1 2263.3 1005.9 41155.7 41399.5
11.4% 1.4% 2.4% 3.8%
12695.7 301.9 109947.5 33195.5 12862.3 302.3 109869.7 33212.6
1.3% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1%
419.3 6906.8 32127.5 221899.6 550.6 7107.9 31041.4 220640.6
31.3% 2.9% -3.4% -0.6%
308.1 1615.4 830.4 1341.4 377.1 1614.5 819.9 1323.7
22.4% -0.1% -1.3% -1.3%
531.5 13207.7 2697.0 35621.3 440.9 12693.4 2786.3 35367.9
-17.1% -3.9% 3.3% -0.7%
39.5 3570.8 245.8 -41.3 3199.9 249.7
-204.6% -10.4% 1.6%













1 Income is defined as revenues plus premiums minus costs. It is important to note that in the case of animal activities decoupled pre-
miums do not remain at the activity level but are distributed on land (fodder and grassland), so that income is not anymore a good 
indicator. 
Source: own calculations; CAPRI Modelling System Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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factors. Most farms in the majority of the other countries are 
in a group where cuts are around 3%, so that modulation 
would cut premiums by about 3% on average. Smaller 
average cuts due to modulation are found in Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain, Italy and Finland, reflecting the fact that larger 
shares of farms are exempt from modulation. The low per-
centages in the Mediterranean not only reflect small aver-
age farm size, but also a production program with generally 
smaller premiums per hectare. 
Decreases of premiums, for example in some French re-
gions (Limousin and Auvergne), are due to the effect of 
reduced beef fattening activities in combination with cou-
pled support. Whereas envelopes for beef fattening activi-
ties are simulated to be exhausted under Agenda 2000 in 
France, under the Luxembourg Compromise less than the 
remaining decoupled budget is paid, since the simulated 
drops in herds no longer fill the envelopes. An analogous 
effect can be observed for durum wheat premiums in 
Greece, partially coupled under the Luxembourg Compro-
mise. Further effects in Mediterranean regions result from 
other general changes in the durum wheat premium 
schemes, the cuts of about 5% of the envelopes for the so-
called traditional regions being the major effect. In Greece, 
for example, this premium scheme accounts for more than 
10% of all premiums received. 
As for the old member states, larger increases in the pre-
mium budget are closely linked to a significant milk pro-
duction per hectare (the dark grey regions in figure 2: the 
Netherlands, Namur in Belgium, Brittany and Basse-
Normandie in France, Lombardia, and to lesser extent Ve-
neto and Emilia-Romana in Italy, Galicia and Cantabria in 
Spain, Denmark, Germany and parts of Austria), as shown 
in figure 2 (white to light grey: 600 kg/ha or less; dark grey 
to black: more than 1,500 kg/ha). 
Table 4.  Evolution of premiums for groups of activities in Germany  

















1000 ha or head 1000 ha or head Mio Euro Mio Euro 1000 ha or head 1000 ha or head Mio Euro Mio Euro
10156.0 10938.0 3534.9
-100.0%
Specific payment for pulses 11.0
10.0 4.6 0.6 10.0
78.7 78.7 47.2 47.2
-40.0% -40.0%
Energy crop payment 15.3
33.6 33.6 33.6 33.6
10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8


















4357.7 3826.4 348.6 306.1
-100.0% -100.0%




Regional flat rate premium 5448.5 5224.7 1309.2 4090.2
Farm specific payment 16983.4 17413.5 67.2 66.4
Hybrid premium farm 1445.4 1403.6
5479.9 5698.8
4.0%
Agenda 2000 Luxembourg compromise 2003
Payments to wine sector 
Payments to fruits and 
vegetables 
Payments to starch potatoes
Direct payment to grandes 
cultures
Established payment to 
durum wheat
Sum 
Direct payment for sheep 
and goat
Suppl. payment for sheep 
and goat
National envelope for sheep 
and goat
National envelope dairy cows
National envelope bovine 
meat cattle
Slaughter premium for adult 
cattle
Slaughter premium for 
calves
Extensification premium
Direct income support to 
dairy cows
Paymanets to tobacco 
Suckler cow premium
Special premium to bulls and 
steers
Source: own calculations, CAPRI Modelling System Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
223 
An analysis of changes in premiums paid by comparing the 
two scenarios for Germany is far from straightforward, due 
to the multiple effects impacting on the results (see table 5 
for an overview). Nevertheless, there are a few interesting 
points to note. The highest premiums per hectare according 
to the model calculations under Agenda 2000 in the year 
2010, as shown in figure 3, are found in Schleswig-Holstein 
and in the regions
16 Arnsberg und Düsseldorf with close to 
400  €/ha and the lowest ones in the regions Oberbayern, 
Weser-Ems und Brandenburg with 260-280  €/ha. High 
premiums in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, are found in 
mixed regional production systems with an overall high 
intensity, producing temperate zone commodities under 
CMO’s mainly affected by lower administrative prices and 
compensating premiums since the 1992 MacSharry reform. 
Low premiums per hectare in Germany are found in mar-
                                                           
16  The Nuts 2 regions in Germany correspond to „Regierungs-
bezirke“ and the Nuts 1 regions to „Bundesländer“. 
ginal areas, either in mountainous regions such as Bavaria, 
or in regions with less productive soils such as Branden-
burg, where historic crop yields and stocking densities in 
cattle are comparatively low, the two major determinants 
for the average premium per hectare. It may be interesting 
to note that the two marginal regions mentioned draw com-
parable amounts of premiums per hectare of agricultural 
land from cattle farming despite their different natural   
conditions. 
A significant part of premium increases moving from the 
Agenda  2000 to the Luxemburg compromise originates 
from higher premiums to dairy cows, falling in the flat rate 
premium and in some cases, from the redistribution be-
tween Nuts  2 regions inside a Nuts  1 region, as shown 
in figure 4. The strong percentage increase in Brandenburg, 
Lüneburg and Trier, all showing up in dark grey, is fully 
due to an approximate doubling of premium envelopes to 
dairy cows, introduced to offset the reduction in the admin-
istrative prices. Stronger reductions in Arnsberg and 
Düsseldorf, regions with very high premiums under Agenda 
2000 (see  figure  3), are due to a redistribution inside of 
‘Nordrhein-Westfalen’ towards other regions, as the re-
gional flat rate system gradually leads to uniform premium 
rates at Nuts 1 level. Oberbayern, as the opposite, had com-
paratively low premiums under Agenda 2000 but benefits 
under the Luxembourg Compromise from a redistribution 
from other Nuts  2 regions in Bavaria, receiving up to 
100 €/ha higher premiums. This explains the reduction in 
regions surrounding Oberbayern. In Brandenburg, however, 
there are no redistribution effects shown in our calculations, 
since all Nuts 2 regions have quite similar premiums per 
hectare. 
The changes in premiums in the new member states are 
generally stronger compared to the EU-15. A comparison of 
the two policy regimes for these countries is not that sim-
ple: despite the fact that we have some information on base 
areas and herd sizes for the EU-10 discussed during the 
negotiation phase, they may not completely reflect how 
premium budgets and their related ceilings may have 
looked like after the final negotiations regarding the acces-
sion. For the EU-10, premiums increase on average by 5% 
when moving to the Luxembourg Compromise. As an over-
Table 5.  Producer prices in Germany (Luxem-
burg Compromise / Agenda 2000 in €; 
year 2010)) 
Producer Price
% Lux. Compromise/ Agenda 2000
Soft wheat 3.2%









Sheep and goat meat 10.0%
Poultry meat 1.5%
Source: own calculations; CAPRI Modelling System
Figure 2.   Milk production per hectare in Europe 
(Agenda 2000 in kg/ha; year 2010) 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
Figure 1.   Premiums per hectare in European Nuts 2 
regions (Luxemburg Compromise /  
Agenda 2000 in %; year 2010)  
Source: CAPRI Modelling System Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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all picture, we infer that the less productive regions may 
have benefited from the compromise as they exhaust their 
budget, whereas under Agenda 2000, the combination of 
coupled support and lower prices had put them in a position 
where base areas for some countries and production activi-
ties would not have been filled. Decreases in some of the 
new member states (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia) may hint at a data constellation where the as-
sumed base areas and herds under Agenda  2000 had   
been optimistic compared to what was negotiated under the 
Luxembourg Compromise. 
4.4 The regional dimension of changes in land use 
The last part of this section will look at changes in land use, 
analysing clusters of regions. A first major effect can be 
seen when looking at changes in fallow land, see figure 5. 
Strong effects can be observed in the new member states 
and some Mediterranean regions. It is important to stress 
that, given the limited information on how the Agenda 2000 
would have been implemented in the EU-10, the effects 
shown here have to be interpreted cautiously. In general, a 
continuation of the Agenda 2000 would have implied that 
part of the variable production costs in regions with 
low cereal and oilseed yields would have been 
covered by coupled premiums, so that decoupled 
support will reduce production in those marginal 
areas. The effects in the Mediterranean regions are 
due to the removal of strong coupled incentives to 
durum wheat and olive oil, the major effect being 
the reduction in durum wheat areas as shown in 
figure 6. Reductions in areas for olive oil produc-
tion are generally lower, due to quite small supply 
elasticities. 
In the cases discussed so far, the Luxembourg 
Compromise leads to an increase in fallow land. 
Increases in fodder areas with no changes in fallow 
land, or even slight reductions, can be found in 
regions with extensive grazing systems (e.g. UK, 
Ireland, Austria, Portugal, northern Spain and some 
regions in France). There are two major effects 
responsible for these results. On arable land, areas 
devoted to fodder production are expanded, as the 
profitability increases relative to cereals, 
oilseeds and fodder maize production, which 
benefited greatly from coupled support in 
Agenda 2000. That expansion is accompa-
nied with a reduction in silage maize which 
is replaced by less intensive fodder produc-
tion. A major determining factor for the 
extent of changes at the regional level is the 
share of fodder maize on arable land (see 
figure 7). As we assumed that fodder maize 
was receiving cereal premiums under the 
Agenda  2000 (and was hence not used to 
increase the “fodder area” in order to comply 
with stocking density restrictions), removal 
of coupled support strongly increases the 
relative competitiveness of other types of 
fodder produced on arable land, as this is 
now eligible under the Luxembourg Com-
promise. In many regions with considerable 
shares of fodder maize, it can be observed 
Figure 3.   Premiums paid per hectare in Germany  
(Agenda 2000 in €; year 2010) 
 








Figure 4.   Change in premiums paid per hectare in Germany,  
(Luxembourg Compromise compared Agenda 2000  
in %; 2010) 
 







Figure 5.   Fallow land and set-aside areas in Euro-
pean Nuts 2 regions (Luxemburg Com-
promise / Agenda 2000 in %; year 2010)
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
 Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
225 
that fallow land increases slightly or even decreases (com-
pare figure 5 and figure 7). 
Additionally, the production intensity on grassland is re-
duced. As CAPRI currently does not model idling of grass-
land, these results are best interpreted as a combination of 
increases both in extensive grazing systems and in idling 
grassland. The fact that statistical information on fallow 
land seems not to be homogeneous across Europe remains 
as a specific problem. On the one side, our data base shows, 
for example, no fallow land in the UK and, accordingly, the 
model cannot simulate a variation (see figure 8). On the 
other hand, larger parts of Spain or the new member states 
are declared as idling Utilizable Agricultural Land in statis-
tics. In many regions where the model shows no change in 
fallow land or even reductions (e.g. England), stronger 
extensification effects in grassland production are simulated 
(compare figure 5 and figure 9). 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, a quantitative analysis of the impacts of the 
Luxembourg agreement compared to the Agenda 2000 
policy is presented for the year 2010. Specific focus is on 
land allocation. The main results at the European level 
confirmed earlier analyses projecting decreases in cereal 
and oilseed acreage, an increase in land allocated to fodder 
and fallow land/set aside, as well as a reduction in beef 
fattening activities. Corresponding output prices generally 
increased. The specific contribution of this paper is a rather 
detailed analysis of national and regional differences in 
adjustment, based on the national policy implementation. 
For example, the smaller adjustments in cereals simulated 
for Germany can be explained with larger than average 
cereal shares at the outset in combination with the decoup-
ling effect and the strong effects on durum wheat produc-
Figure 7.   Share of silage maize on total land 
(Agenda 2000; year 2010) 
 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
Figure 8.   Share of fallow land on total land  
(Agenda 2000; year 2010) 
 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
Figure 9.   Changes in extensive grazing,  
(Luxemburg Compromise / Agenda 2000 
in %; year 2010) 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
Figure 6.   Changes in durum wheat areas  
(Luxemburg compromise / Agenda 2000 
in %; year 2010) 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System Agrarwirtschaft 55 (2006), Heft 5/6 
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tion in other countries. Furthermore, regional changes in 
premiums paid per hectare at Nuts  2 level could be ex-
plained by a combination of redistribution within larger 
regions relevant for the uniform flat rate premium, the rele-
vance of milk production activities in the respective regions 
and the observed effect of underutilized envelopes in case 
of remaining coupled support. 
Although the analysis proved that regional differentiation 
provides a useful tool for understanding land allocation 
effects at national and European level, there are also limita-
tions associated with the chosen modelling approach. The 
representative farms at regional level do not allow to fully 
represent the farm specific premium schemes with poten-
tially differentiated effects between farm types. Also, the 
lacking distinction between eligible land and premium 
rights limits the interpretability of the impact of different 
premium schemes on land rents. Furthermore, missing farm 
structure information within the regions does not allow to 
properly address special small farmer regulations, for ex-
ample in connection to modulation. The latter is currently 
addressed in research activities exploiting information on 
farm types at the regional level. 
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